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IN Rowell v. Pettijohn, the Fifth Circuit deepened the circuit split onwhether states’ anti-surcharge laws regulate economic conduct or im-plicate the First Amendment’s free speech protections.1 The court
held that Texas’s anti-surcharge law, which forbids merchants from im-
posing surcharges for items purchased with credit cards, but allows the
imposition of discounts for cash purchases,2 regulates economic conduct
rather than speech, and therefore does not raise a First Amendment is-
sue.3 In deciding the case, the court applied faulty reasoning in insisting
that there is a meaningful distinction between a surcharge and a discount.
This crucial misstep in its analysis led the court to hold that Texas’s anti-
surcharge law does not implicate the First Amendment and, therefore,
that merchants cannot choose how to label the prices of their goods and
services.4
The Texas law was originally “enacted to address how the ‘swipe fee’ of
two to three percent of the purchase price, which credit-card issuers
charge merchants for each transaction paid with a credit card, is passed
on from the merchant to the consumer.”5 Prior to the enactment of the
Texas law, Congress had passed the Truth in Lending Act, which prohib-
ited merchants from imposing surcharges.6 After receiving extensive criti-
cism, the federal ban was allowed to expire in 1984.7 As a result, major
credit card companies began including prohibitions on surcharges in their
contracts with merchants.8 Simultaneously, several states, including Texas
in 1985, enacted their own legislation in order to continue regulating the
swipe fees.9 Twenty years later, a slew of antitrust actions against credit
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1. See 816 F.3d 73, 80 (5th Cir. 2016).
2. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 339.001 (West 2015).
3. See Rowell, 816 F.3d at 80.
4. See id.
5. Id. at 76.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 77.
9. See Rowell, 816 F.3d at 77.
197
198 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
card companies that prohibited the surcharges arose, which caused them
to eventually lift the ban, and left only state laws to prohibit surcharges.10
The plaintiffs in Rowell are a group of Texas merchants who challenged
the law on the grounds that it violates the First Amendment’s free speech
protections.11 They sued Leslie L. Pettijohn in her official capacity as
Commissioner of Texas’s Office of Consumer Credit in the U.S. District
Court for the Western Division of Texas, Austin Division.12 The
merchants argued that the law implicated the First Amendment because
it “deprive[d] them of the right to tell a customer that goods or services
will cost more if paid for with a credit card rather than cash.”13 Instead,
they had to tell consumers that the posted price would be less if they used
cash, with no mention of the posted price actually being a surcharge.14
They asserted that because the law dictated how they describe the pricing
scheme to customers, it violated the First Amendment.15
The district court disagreed that the law implicates the First Amend-
ment’s free speech protections and granted Pettijohn’s 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.16 The court held that the “law regulates only prices charged—an
economic activity that is within the state’s police power—and does not
implicate First Amendment speech rights.”17 The court explained that,
ultimately, the law merely sets the maximum price that can be posted
because in only prohibiting a surcharge on the sticker price, the law al-
lows merchants to offer a discount on the sticker price for cash
purchases.18 By setting a ceiling on the charged price in relation to the
sticker price, the law regulates conduct rather than speech.19
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding for two
primary reasons.20 First, in looking at the plain language of the statute,
the court found that the law prohibits certain economic conduct—impos-
ing surcharges on credit card purchases—but is silent as to offering dis-
counts for cash purchases, thus indicating that surcharges and discounts
are two different types of economic conduct and not merely differences in
characterization.21 Second, the court analyzed whether prices themselves
are “speech” within the First Amendment, holding that they are not by
relying heavily on the Second Circuit’s analysis of the same issue in Ex-
pressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman.22 Therefore, the court held, “[i]f
prohibiting certain prices does not implicate the First Amendment, it fol-
10. Id.
11. Id. at 75–76.
12. Rowell v. Pettijohn, No. A-14-CA-190-LY, 2015 WL 10818660, at *1 (W.D. Tex.





17. Id. at *3.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 80 (5th Cir. 2016).
21. Id. at 81.
22. See id. at 82.
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lows that prohibiting certain relationships between prices also does not
implicate it.”23
In analyzing the issue, the court placed a great deal of emphasis on two
other cases dealing with state anti-surcharge laws and the First Amend-
ment: (1) the Second Circuit’s decision in Expressions, which upheld New
York’s anti-surcharge law, and (2) the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Florida, which struck down Florida’s anti-
surcharge law.24 In analyzing the plain text of Texas’s anti-surcharge law,
the Fifth Circuit followed the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Expressions.
Like the New York law, Texas’s law only forbids surcharges and does not
prevent merchants from offering discounts to cash-paying customers.25
The court explained, “While a merchant may have the same ultimate eco-
nomic result if it applies the same amount in the form of a credit-card
surcharge that it would otherwise apply as a cash discount, the law does
not require that.”26 Instead, the law allows merchants to impose a dual-
pricing scheme, therefore regulating conduct rather than characteriza-
tion.27 Lastly, the court looked to the legislative history, which suggested
that the law’s intent was to ban surcharges and thereby protect consum-
ers, thus indicating that the law prohibits the conduct of imposing
surcharges, rather than regulating the way in which prices are character-
ized and communicated.28
In holding that prices themselves are not speech within the First
Amendment, the court first made the argument that because “price-con-
trol laws . . . have never been thought to implicate the First Amendment,”
they simply do not.29 The court then quickly concluded that if price-con-
trol laws do not implicate the First Amendment’s free speech protections,
then “prohibiting certain relationships between prices” does not either.30
The court next pointed out that under the law, merchants are not prohib-
ited from talking about and explaining price differences with customers,
but this “does not transform [the law] into a content-based speech restric-
tion” because speaking about the differential is “merely incidental” to the
prohibition.31
In addressing the circuit split, the court distinguished the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s holding in Dana’s R.R. Supply by first drawing a distinction be-
tween the Florida law’s express exclusion of “discounts” from the
23. Id. at 82 (quoting Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 131 (2d
Cir. 2015)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. See id. at 78; Expressions, 808 F.3d at 122; Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Florida, 807 F.3d
1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2015).
25. Rowell, 816 F.3d at 80–81; see TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 339.001 (West 2015); N.Y.
GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 2015).
26. Rowell, 816 F.3d at 81.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 81–82; Hearing on Tex. H.B. 1558 Before the H. Comm. On Fin. Insts.,
69th Leg. R.S. (1985).
29. See id. at 82 (quoting Expressions, 808 F.3d at 130).
30. Id. (quoting Expressions, 808 F.3d at 130).
31. Id.
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prohibition and the Texas law’s silence on discounts.32 The court then
disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that there is “no real-world
difference” between a surcharge and a discount.33 Instead, the court rea-
soned that lumping the two together fails to consider the differences in
the economic conduct that is regulated because in only banning
surcharges above the sticker price, “the end result of a discount does not
always equal a surcharge.”34
Circuit Judge James L. Dennis firmly dissented from the majority in
Rowell. He pointed out that although the statute silently permitted dual-
pricing schemes, merchants’ speech is ultimately regulated by the statute
if they choose this type of pricing scheme because the statute dictates
how they may describe the prices to customers.35 While they may de-
scribe the difference as a discount, they may not describe it as a
surcharge.36 In characterizing the price difference as a surcharge, the
merchant would not be “assessing ‘additional’ fees above a ‘regular’
price; he [would] only [be] characterizing a perfectly legal price differen-
tial in a chosen way.”37 Ultimately, the merchant would be violating
Texas’s law “because of the content of his speech, not because of the na-
ture of his conduct.”38
The dissent also interpreted the way in which the Second Circuit, in
Expressions, described the difference in regulating actual prices versus
regulating how merchants describe those prices to customers.39 The court
in Expressions, like the majority in Rowell, held that the law only regu-
lates credit-cash price differentials and the sticker price.40 The dissent
emphasized the Second Circuit’s explanation that when merchants im-
pose a surcharge on credit card purchases, there is no way they could
characterize the price differential in order to make it legal. But, if they
were to offer a discount instead, they could characterize the prices how-
ever they want without violating the law.41 The dissent argues that this
differentiates the New York law in Expressions from the Texas law be-
cause the New York law only regulates purely economic conduct by not
restricting how merchants describe their prices. On the contrary, the
Texas law, as applied to dual pricing schemes, does restrict how
merchants may describe their prices, rather than regulating what the price
32. See Rowell, 816 F.3d at 83; compare FLA. STAT. § 501.0117 (West 2016), with TEX.
FIN. CODE ANN. § 339.001(a) (West 2015).
33. Rowell, 816 F.3d at 83; see Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Florida, 807 F.3d 1235, 1245
(11th Cir. 2015).
34. Rowell, 816 F.3d at 83.
35. See id. at 85 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
36. See id. (Dennis, J., dissenting); FIN. § 339.001.
37. Rowell, 816 F.3d at 85 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
38. Id. (Dennis, J., dissenting).
39. See id. at 85–86 (Dennis, J., dissenting); see also id. at 81 (majority opinion).
40. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 132 (2d Cir. 2015);
Rowell, 816 F.3d at 82.
41. See Rowell, 816 F.3d at 85–86 (Dennis, J., dissenting); Expressions, 808 F.3d at 132.
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itself can be.42
The majority in Rowell erred in finding that there is a meaningful dif-
ference between a surcharge and a discount. In Dana’s R.R. Supply, the
Eleventh Circuit demonstrated the real-world similarity between the two
by explaining that “[i]f the same copy of Plato’s Republic can be had for
$30 in cash or $32 by credit card, absent any communication from the
seller,” it is unclear whether the customer would incur a $2 surcharge or
receive a $2 discount.43 Conversely, the Fifth Circuit held that lumping
surcharges and discounts together fails to consider differences in the eco-
nomic conduct that is regulated because “the end result of a discount
does not always equal a surcharge.”44 However, the results are the same.
The end result of offering a discount for cash purchases is that credit card
users pay more for the same item than cash users—the same result as if a
surcharge were imposed. There is no real-world difference between a
surcharge and a discount because, as the Eleventh Circuit pointed out,
the price differential still exists.45
However, this does not necessarily implicate the First Amendment’s
free speech protections. To implicate the First Amendment, the statute
must regulate speech directly, rather than incidentally.46 While the major-
ity’s proposition that state regulation of prices does not typically impli-
cate the First Amendment is well-grounded,47 its mistake was finding that
merchant speech explaining the pricing rationale to customers was only
incidentally regulated by the statute. The majority defends its holding
that the law does not implicate the First Amendment by reasoning that
“simply speaking about the prices . . . is merely incidental to the regulated
economic conduct” and merchants can still “infor[m] customers about the
cost of credit” and “encourage[e] them to use cash, or expres[s] views on
pricing policy more generally.”48
While it is true that simply speaking about the prices is incidental to the
regulation, this is not the speech at issue. The speech at issue is the way in
which the prices are characterized—not the prices themselves nor the
merchants’ general views on pricing policy.49 Further, as the majority in-
dicated, the law’s legislative history shows that it was enacted in order to
ban the imposition of surcharges, but, as the Eleventh Circuit noted, “[a]
law enacted for the sole purpose of forbidding a price difference to be
labeled a surcharge, while allowing the same to be called a discount, does
42. See Rowell, 816 F.3d at 86 (Dennis, J., dissenting); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518
(McKinney 2015); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 339.001 (West 2015).
43. Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Florida, 807 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015).
44. Rowell, 816 F.3d at 83.
45. See Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1245.
46. See Rowell, 816 F.3d at 80 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565
(2011)).
47. See id. at 82.
48. Id. (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47,
62 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. See id. at 77–78.
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not impose an ‘incidental burden’ on speech.”50 By mischaracterizing the
speech at issue, the majority avoided deciding whether the law is a con-
tent-based speech restriction.
As the dissent makes clear, the fact that dual-pricing schemes are per-
mitted under the statute transforms the law into a content-based speech
restriction. In fact, the majority inadvertently admitted that, when ap-
plied to the dual-pricing context, it does prohibit certain speech.51 While
a merchant may post two different prices for the same goods or services
(one for credit users and one for cash users), the law prohibits merchants
from describing their prices in a certain way, thereby regulating speech
rather than economic conduct.52 This is because “[a] merchant [imple-
menting a dual-pricing scheme] who describes the difference between
[its] prices as a surcharge is not assessing ‘additional’ fees above a ‘regu-
lar’ price; he is only characterizing a perfectly legal price differential in a
chosen way.”53 Essentially, being in compliance with Texas’s law ulti-
mately turns on the language that the merchant chooses in describing its
price differentials. As the Eleventh Circuit put it, the effect that anti-
surcharge statutes have on dual-pricing schemes makes calling these stat-
utes “no-surcharge law[s]” inaccurate because, in effect, they are more of
“surcharges-are-fine-just-don’t-call-them-that-law[s].”54
While the Rowell decision has been petitioned for certiorari, it may not
be granted because the United States Supreme Court has already granted
review of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Expressions.55 Since the
Rowell majority relied on Expressions in crucial steps of its analysis, and
the two states’ laws are incredibly similar, the Supreme Court’s review of
Expressions may shed some light on whether the Fifth Circuit properly
decided Rowell. However, there are still serious policy implications aris-
ing from the Rowell decision. By upholding Texas’s anti-surcharge law,
the court has incidentally perpetuated the national problem of rising con-
sumer debt. When faced with the possibility of a surcharge for using
credit, consumers are more likely to pay with the more affordable alter-
native of cash, which ultimately results in less consumer debt and a
stronger economy.56 Additionally, keeping the anti-surcharge law in place
reduces the likelihood that banks will compete with one another to have
the lowest possible interchange fee.57 By prohibiting surcharges,
50. Dana’s R.R Supply, 807 F.3d at 1247–48; see also Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 566–67.
51. See Rowell, 816 F.3d at 85 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
52. Id. (Dennis, J., dissenting); see TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 339.001 (West 2015); see
also Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1245 (explaining that, in the context of dual-pricing,
compliance with Florida’s anti-surcharge statute requires that “a [merchant] must commu-
nicate the price difference to a customer and that communication must denote the relevant
price difference as a credit-card surcharge”) (emphasis in original).
53. Rowell, 816 F.3d at 85 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
54. Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1245.
55. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
56. See Samuel J. Merchant, Comment, Merchant Restraints: Credit-Card-Transaction
Surcharging and Interchange-Fee Regulation in the Wake of Landmark Industry Changes,
68 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 368–69 (2016).
57. Id. at 370.
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merchant-discount “fees are concealed from consumers and therefore in-
sulated from the competition in a free market.”58 If the United States
Supreme Court does not reverse Expressions, increasing consumer debt
will not be ameliorated and interchange fees will remain high.
In conclusion, the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Rowell is unconvincing. It
not only failed to recognize that the distinction between a surcharge and
a discount is a distinction without a difference, but it also erred in focus-
ing on reassuring merchants that they could still discuss with customers
why the prices vary. Ultimately, the fact that the statute does not prohibit
a dual-pricing scheme is what renders Texas’s anti-surcharge law a regula-
tion of speech rather than conduct.
58. Id.
